Donate to Safeguard Midterm Elections

Election subversion refers to efforts—by any party or actor—to undermine free and fair elections by interfering with voting, vote counting, certification, or the lawful transfer of power.

Based on expert analysis, realistic threats include:

• Voter purges and voter intimidation

• Challenges to valid voter registrations or ballots

• Disruption of election offices (e.g., excessive records requests)

• Disinformation about election processes or outcomes

• Vexatious or coordinated litigation to halt counting or certification

• Threats or violence against election administrators

• Abuse of federal authority to interfere with state or local election processes

• Immigration enforcement actions near polling places

• Attempts to restrict or eliminate absentee or early voting

• Seizure or interference with election materials

Through its Strategic Task Force for Election Protection (STEP), Crimson Goes Blue concluded that preventing election subversion in 2026 is essential to securing Democratic victories—and that the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) is uniquely positioned to act early and at scale.

Democratic Attorneys General have the legal authority to enforce election laws, challenge unlawful interference, and coordinate multistate responses. DAGA strengthens this work by providing strategic legal guidance, coordination, and preparedness tools. Its election-subversion simulations—many of whose scenarios played out in real life in 2024—are a proven, high-leverage way to turn early preparation into real defensive capacity.

Supporting this work is not separate from CGB’s electoral mission; it is election insurance to ensure votes are counted, results upheld, and Democratic wins protected.

While past subversion efforts focused on swing states, many highly competitive congressional races in 2026 are in deep-blue states that have not historically faced sustained election interference. In fact, 16 DCCC Frontline or Red-to-Blue races are in states won by Democrats at the top of the ticket. These states are now facing unprecedented federal hostility toward the democratic process, making preparation essential.

Not uniformly. Deep-blue states have often had less reason to prepare for subversion because statewide outcomes were rarely in doubt. In addition:

• Many AGs and election-law staff were not in office in 2020

• The federal government has never before been this openly adverse to election integrity

• AG offices are simultaneously defending states on many fronts (e.g., energy, SNAP, childcare, immigration enforcement), stretching limited election-law capacity

Preparation now fills real gaps.

Awareness is not the same as readiness. Effective defense requires:

• Thinking through legal responses in advance

• Developing coordinated communications strategies

• Identifying gaps in statutes or case law

• Clarifying authority before a crisis hits

Simulations are how this preparation happens.

Secretaries of State are invited to participate in exercises and send staff, but Attorneys General are the state’s lawyers. They:

• Represent the state in court

• Defend against legal challenges

• Interface with state and federal law enforcement

• Advise election officials on how to respond to federal demands

When litigation or coercion arises, AGs are the ones who act.

In-person exercises generate a level of engagement, cross-state learning, and creative problem-solving that virtual exercises simply cannot match—especially under crisis-like conditions.

Participants work in multi-state teams and respond to realistic election-crisis scenarios led by an external moderator. As the exercise unfolds, new facts are introduced to test legal authority, communications strategy, and coordination.

Example scenario:
A county board refuses to certify election results, defies a court order, and cites viral—but possibly fake—videos alleging ballot fraud. Deadlines for certification are looming, and legal authority is unclear.

Teams must address questions such as:

• Is certification mandatory or discretionary under state law?

• Can the state certify results if a local body refuses?

• What are the timelines for court challenges?

• How should misinformation be handled in real time?

These discussions surface gaps that can be addressed before a real crisis.

Funds will support travel and meeting costs required to conduct these national, in-person simulations and related preparatory work. State budgets generally cannot cover partisan-adjacent election-protection activities.

Use of the funds is governed by written agreement between DAGA and Crimson Goes Blue and may be reviewed through standard auditing processes, which assess both what was promised and how funds were actually spent.

No.

No, unless you’d like to promote the fact that you made a leadership level contribution ($1,000 or over) to incentivize others to make larger contributions.

CGB and the Class will not publish names of donors. However Federal Election Commission rules to promote transparency mean that the names and towns of all donors to campaigns and PACs are publicly available on FEC website.

Because this is a class project organized by Crimson Goes Blue, we’ve developed a one stop donor platform that will help us to track the progress of the class and also account for contributions that are part of our overall political fundraising which we conduct via the Crimson Goes Blue Portfolio.   

All of the funds that are donated via this Portfolio go directly to DAGA.